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NOTES
DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT-STATUTORY CON-
STRUCTION-BREACH OF CONTRACT
RESULTING IN DEATH.
An important question of no little interest to those of the
legal profession and of momentous significance to landlords and
tenants, is the liability of a landlord to a tenant for the breach
of his contract to keep the leased premises heated, which breach
becomes the proximate cause of injury or death to the tenant
or one in privity with him. From time immemorial no notice has
been taken by the courts of any duties of a landlord existing in
favor of his tenants excepting such duties as are established be-
tween the parties by contract, and then only such damages have
been allowed for the breach of the covenant as were In the con-
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templation of the parties at the time of the letting. But this
attitude has not prevailed against third parties who suffered by
reason of the landlord's breach of the contract with the tenant,
and they have been allowed to recover against the landlord in
an action ex delicto for a breach of duty imposed by law on a
landlord to make and keep the premises safe for those that are
rightfully on such premises. Glidden v. Goodfellow,, 124 Minn.
101; Roddy v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 104 Mo. 234; contra, Tuttle v.
Gilbert Manf. Co., 145 Mass. 169. This stringent duty toward a
third party still exists and in the recently adjudicated case of Keiper
v. Anderson, 138 Minn. 392, the old doctrine of non-liability of a
landlord to a tenant for personal injuries sustained by reason of
a landlord's breach of no more than a contract duty was repudiated
and the widow of the deceased was allowed to recover full dam-
ages for the non-performance of the defendant's contract to keep
the premises heated to a comfortable degree during specified
months of the year.
Anderson, a landlord and the defendant in the case above
cited, as a part of his contract with the plaintiff's intestate, agreed
to keep the premises heated to a comfortable and proper tempera-
ture each year, from October to April, inclusive. He failed to do so
and the tenant, deceased, contracted a severe cold which later
resulted in his death. 1913 Minn. G. S. No. 8175 allows "an ac-
tion for the benefit of the next of kin of a deceased person, whose
death was caused by the wrongful acts or omissions of another,"
and it is under this statute that the widow of the deceased brings
this action, alleging repeatedly the negligence and carelessness
of the defendant resulting in the death of her husband.
After the passage and adoption of the Lord Campbell Act
in England in 1846 the majority of our American States enacted
into their statutes a similar act conferring a right of action upon
the widow or next of kin of the deceased whose death was the
direct result of the wrongful act or omissions of another. Under
this statute a widow can no doubt recover in damages but, the
degree of recovery is dependent upon the construction of it in the
particular state. Some jurisdictions have construed this to be a
"death statute," giving to the widow of the deceased two causes
of action; the first, ex contractu, for the breach of the contract on
which the deceased might have sued had he lived, and the second,
ex delicto, for the death of the deceased. Other jurisdictions, and
among them the Supreme Court of Minnesota, have construed
such statutes to be "survival statute," giving to the widow or next
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of kin the right of action the deceased would have had, had he
lived, plus the added element of his death. The two constructions
of these statutes are squarely in conflict with one another, but the
weight of authority is to allow two recoveries. Bowers v. City of
Boston, 155 Mass. 344; Needhorn v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 38
Vt. 294.
Under the "death statute" construction the widow would have
no trouble in securing a final judgment in an action ex delicto, for,
her cause of action would be based on the right of a third party
to recover in damages for the breach of the landlord's duty result-
ing in loss or injury to the third party. Supra. 124 Minn. 101. In
the states which construe the statute to be a "survival statute"
the action is brought ex contractu, but the Minnesota court in
Keiper v. Anderson, held that it was immaterial that the action
is called ex contractu or ex delicto, since the non-performance of
such a contract duty is such an omission as will under the statute
render one liable in damages for all the consequences arising from
the failure to act. And they cite a great many cases in point
where a landlord for the non-performance of no more than a duty
imposed by contract has been held liable in tort. In the Kentucky
case of Dice, Adm'r., v. Barbour, Adm'r., 161 Ky. 646, the opinion
of the court was "that where a legal duty arises out of a contract,
a breach of such duty resulting in death will ground an action in
tort for the wrongful death." In Heizer v. Kingsland &.Douglass
Manf. Co., 110 Mo., pp. 611, the court was of the opinion that a
tort action may often arise from the breach of duty created by
contract, but that to hold the defendant there must be a privity
between the person injured and the defendant. Roddy v. Mo. Pac.
Ry., 104 Mo. 234, also supports this doctrine. Again in Fowler
Cycle Works v. Fraser & Chalmers, 110 Ill. App. 126, the court
held that "as between a landlord and tenant there is always a
general duty to so use one's own as not to injure another, and that
when such a general duty having been established by contract is
breached by a negligent performance or a non-performance of
duty, the landlord is liable in an action ex delicto." Quoting from
Shearm & Redfield on Negligence, Book Three, 6th Ed., Sec. 708a,
"a covenant by a landlord to keep the premises in a safe and ten-
antable condition, will in the absence of contributory negligence
on the part of the tenant, lay the landlord liable in an action of
tort." For this liability of a landlord in tort for the breach of a
contract duty we have a Missouri case in point; Thompson v.
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Clemens, 96 Mo. 196, deciding that "the negligent failure of a
landlord, having agreed to repair the premises, which failure re-
sults in an injury to the tenant, will render him liable in tort, and
the fact that such a duty had as its foundation a contract does not
preclude the plaintiff from suing in tort."
As regards these heating cases the Minnesota courts have
been consistent in allowing a tenant to recover for injury to health
or person resulting from the breach of a landlord's contract to
heat. An action will always lie for the misfeasance of a contract,
but not generally for nothing more than a non-feasance, but the
courts have held that non-feasance in cases of this description
result in such consequence that it is an omission such as will
ground an action against the landlord for death or injuries of the
tenant. In Whittaker v. Collins, 34 Minn. 299, all the allegations
of negligence and wrong done came to but one point; the failure
of the landlord to heat the premises as he had agreed to, and
the gist of the action was based on the contract.
If one maintains any doubt as to where the Missouri Supreme
Court stands on this matter they have only to read a few of the
leading cases decided by this tribunal within the last few years
to find that a landlord is liable on his breach of contrart with his
tenant for only such damages as were in the contemplation of the
parties, and that for a non-feasance of no more than a contract
duty, an action in tort for injury will not lie, though there might be
eases where a misfeasance of such a contract would lay the land-
lord liable for personal injuries arising from the breach of the
contract. The leading Missouri case on this question of a land-
lord's liability to his tenant for a breach of covenant is Glenn v.
Hill, reported in 210 Mo. 291. The action was brought in tort by
the widow of the deceased to recover for the death of her husband
alleged to have been caused by the defendant's breach of contract
to repair the premises, whereby the plaintiff's husband died from
exposure. The plaintiff attempted to convert the breach of con-
tract into a tort and to maintain an action to recover in damages
for the death of her husband under Secs. 5245-5246, R. S. Mo. 1909,
but the court did not allow this and decided that "the gravman
of the plaintiff's action was for the failure to perform the contract
and that no actual negligence such as would be necessary on
which to ground a tort action was shown." At this point the
court generalized a bit and stated their opinion to be "that where
the only relation between the parties is contractual, the liability of
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one to another in tort for the negligence must be based upon some
positive duty which the law imposes because of the relationship,
or because of the negligent manner in which some act which thie
contract provided for was done. The mere violation of a contract
duty where there is no general duty will not ground an action in
tort" Cases in support of this rule of law are: Davis v. Smith,
26 R. I. 129; Schik v. Fleischauer, 26 App. Div. (N. Y.) 210, and
Tuttle v. Gilbert Manf. Co., 145 Mass. 169, where the court held
"that as the relation between the parties was purely contractual, a
violation of the contract by the landlord did not create any liabil-
ity in tort." Bishop on Non-Contract Law, Sec. 76, confirming
this.
An early Missouri case on this subject is that of Graft v.
Brewing Co., 130 Mo. App. 623, in the decision of which Judge
Johnson of the Kansas City Court of Appeals quoted a rule an-
nounced in Quay v. Lucas, 25 Mo. App. 4, "that where a covenant
creates a duty, the neglect to perform that duty is ground for an
action in tort." In square conflict with this decision is Murphy v.
Dee, 190 Mo. App. 83, which decision is sustained by Kohnle v.
Paxton, 268 Mo. 463, the latest authority on this subject. The
latter case was an action brought in tort to recover in damages for
injuries sustained by reason of the defendant's failure to perform
on his covenant to keep the premises in repair. In brief the de-
cision of the court was "that an agreement to repair, does not
contemplate a destruction of life or an injury to the person which
may result from an omission to fulfill the terms of the agreement,
and an action in tort will not lie for injuries resulting from the
breach."
From the bearing of these authoritative Missouri cases it
readily appears that the Missouri courts are'not in harmony with
the decision of Keiper v. Anderson but are following the common
law principles as regards a landlord's liability to his tenant on
an express covenant to repair. Sec. 5438, R. S. Mo. 1909, does not
prevent the widow from recovering on any cause of action her hus-
band would have had, had he lived, but the measure of damages
and the defendant's liability is no more than if such death had
not occurred. Under the Missouri decisions the widow cannot
maintain an action ex delicto for the death of her husband result-
ing from the non-performance of a covenant to keep the premises.
heated and Sec. 5438, R. S. Mo. 1909, will preclude her from re-
covering any more than her husband could have recovered had he
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lived, so that, unless by some recent Municipal Law creating a
duty upon a landlord to perform his contract to heat the prem-
ises, and fixing a liability for the non-performance of the con-
tract, one contracting a serious and permanent disease, or one
sustaining a substantial loss by the death of the husband, wife
or other members of the family, is substan-ially injured without
a legal remedy to recover damages suffered. It appears to the
writer that the legal maxim "Non injuria sine damno" has been
completely ignored and that appropriate legislation under the
Police powers of the state should be enacted imposing a liability
upon landlords to heat their premises as agreed by contract.
Note-Since completing this article it has come to the writer's
knowledge that the Legislature of New York State has recently
passed an act imposing a liability upon a landlord who fails to heat
his tenement as prescribed by the statute.
KARL P. SPENCER, '22.
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